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1 – Introduction 
 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established in 1964 with a 
UN General Assembly mandate to promote global convergence through the creation of a new economic 
order supporting rapid development in the South. This mission, and the institution‟s political roots 
within the non-aligned movement (now G-77 and China), have led most advanced economies (AEs) 
and multilateral organisations to systematically and, at times, aggressively, undermine UNCTAD and 
its work (Bielshowsky and Macedo e Silva, 2016; Toye, 2014a; Wade, 2013).  
 
In contrast with „optimistic‟ mainstream economic development thinking that free markets, free trade 
and the free circulation of capital will spontaneously deliver global convergence, UNCTAD‟s work 
shows that the world economy is systemically uneven. Asymmetries across international flows of trade, 
finance and technology, vulnerability to external shocks, and capacity to exploit new sources of growth 
limit the economic prospects of developing nations, and reproduce global economic hierarchies.  
 
In response, UNCTAD has led important initiatives to reform international trade, increase global co-
operation, and improve the effectiveness of the intervention of developing and transition economies 
(DTEs) within international institutions. Those initiatives led to important achievements for the South, 
for example the establishment of special drawing rights (SDRs), the 0.7 per cent of GDP aid target, the 
General System of Trade Preferences (GSTPs), the identification of the needs of the least developed 
countries, persistent calls for external debt relief, and the inclusion of structural transformation into the 
Sustainable Development Goals (Toye, 2014b, pp.38, 45, 89; TDR, 2016, p.98; UNCTAD, 2012, 
p.vii).  
 
These efforts were limited, in the early 1980s, by the global transition to neoliberalism and the 
international debt crisis. They gave rise to one (or even two) „lost‟ decade(s) for many developing 
countries whilst, simultaneously, deepening the integration of DTEs into the global economy. Despite 
subsequent attacks on its funding, structures, staffing and capabilities, UNCTAD has continued to 
generate cutting edge research and policy advice promoting the interests of the DTEs and confronting 
the neoliberal „one-size-fits-all‟ prescriptions pushed by the international financial institutions (IFIs) 
(Bielshowsky and Macedo e Silva, 2016). 
 
The Trade and Development Report (TDR) was launched in 1981 to offer the DEs independent 
research on trade and development issues legitimised by the imprimatur of the UN system (UNCTAD, 
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2012, p.1). Over time, the TDR became UNCTAD‟s flagship publication and the lynchpin of the 
organisation‟s transition from a negotiating forum for North-South dialogue to the UN‟s most creative 
development think tank. Successive volumes of the TDR highlight the risks of an unbalanced global 
economy, the perverse outcomes of structural adjustment programmes, the threats from unregulated 
capital flows, liberalised trade and the aid industry, the dangers of premature deindustrialisation, and so 
on, while simultaneously offering the DTEs bold policy alternatives. These claims and conclusions are 
not universally accepted even within UNCTAD itself; the scope of the organisation has tended to 
become narrower and more mainstream over time, for example through its prestigious (and well-
resourced) Investment Division, while UNCTAD initiatives have focused increasingly on small-scale 
development projects around logistics or customs software. Nevertheless, the Division on Globalization 
and Development Strategies, that publishes the TDR, unquestionably remains the (heterodox) 
intellectual core of UNCTAD. 
 
This wide-ranging critique of neoliberalism and the global order it has spawned has become organised 
around the concept of „finance-driven‟ (or „finance-led‟) globalisation (FDG), that is, the „dominant 
pattern of international economic relations during the past three decades‟ (UNCTAD, 2011, p.5; see 
also TDR, 2012 p.14, TDR, 2013 p.39, TDR, 2014 p.68, TDR, 2016 p.146 and UNCTAD, 2012, 
p.viii). A key feature of this new era of capitalism is that „the financial sector has expanded 
significantly and international capital mobility … has soared following successive waves of financial 
innovation and market deregulation‟ (TDR, 2015, p.88). The notion of FDG captures the systemic 
character of these changes and is deployed in opposition to the mainstream cheerleading about the 
potential of „globalisation‟ and neoliberal policies to deliver development (TDR 2015, pp.33, 88). 
Closely related to the critique of FDG, the TDR also insists on the need for better global governance 
and a more appropriate balance between multilateral rules and national policy autonomy, embodied in 
the concept of „policy space‟ (see TDR, 2006, 2014). The TDR‟s contributions have been especially 
salient in the aftermath of the current global crisis, when successive Reports have highlighted the 
dysfunctionality of the dominant monetary, trade and financial policies, and their adverse implications 
for global fragility and the ensuing economic slowdown. 
 
This article reviews the analysis and policy proposals in the TDR 2015, in the light both of the „TDR 
approach‟ developed by UNCTAD, and the constraints under which the organisation operates (for an 
earlier assessment of the TDR in Development & Change, see Rada, 2014). The next section outlines 
the „TDR approach‟ to macroeconomic policy and development, the third section summarises the main 
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contributions of the TDR 2015, and the fourth examines the Report‟s limitations. The fifth section 
concludes. 
 
2 – The ‘TDR Approach’ 
 
It is impossible to understand the work of UNCTAD in general, and the TDR series specifically, apart 
from the intellectual traditions underpinning the Report, which support its critical positions on 
development thought and policy advice and provide a comprehensive critique of mainstream 
development currents (Karshenas, 2016). In contrast, the TDR supports an evolving set of 
developmental policy alternatives grounded upon heterodox economics. 
 
The approach of the TDR is „middle range‟ in the sense of Merton (1968). It draws conceptually on 
Keynes, Schumpeter, Kalecki, Prebisch, Kaldor, Minsky and their followers across the Structuralist, 
Post-Keynesian, Institutionalist, Evolutionary and other heterodox schools of thought (Calcagno, 2012, 
p.124; Fortin, 2012, p.103; UNCTAD, 2012, p.9). Middle range approaches are primarily inductive, 
eschewing „grand‟ theoretical frameworks and departing, instead, from empirical generalisations, 
which Kaldor referred to as stylised facts. They ground the analytical structures that, eventually, 
explain those facts at increasing levels of generality (Saad-Filho, 2000).  
 
This approach spawns policy alternatives based on the perceived structures of the world economy and 
on observed regularities, for example, global interdependence, trade and financial asymmetries between 
AEs and DTEs, policy space, unsustainable debt burdens, immiserising growth, premature 
deindustrialisation, and so on. These concepts figure prominently in each TDR, and the Reports 
privilege „well-targeted pragmatism‟ (UNCTAD, 2012, p.1), policy coherence (e.g. TDR, 2004) and 
context-specificity (UNCTAD, 2012, p.43) in development policy-making. This approach is well suited 
to a UN agency under continuing existential threat, where rarefied academic debate or uncompromising 
policy choices logically derived from first principles would be both institutionally misplaced and 
politically untenable.  
 
The intellectual thrust of the TDR is predicated on six key ideas. First, and along the traditional lines of 
Latin American structuralism, DTE development prospects are limited by the international economic 
and institutional architecture (Gore, 2004; Gore, 2012, especially p.91; Karshenas, 2016). 
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Second, the countries that converged with the advanced „core‟ of the world economy since the 19th 
Century had to overcome binding cost, technological, labour market and balance of payments 
constraints. This was invariably done through the expansion of high productivity activities, drawing 
upon a careful choice of sectoral priorities, rapid capital accumulation, continuous technological 
learning, and institutional adaptation (UNCTAD, 2012, p.11; see also Amsden, 1997, 2001).  
 
Third, those experiences validate the heterodox view that economic growth is sectorally-biased; that is, 
a unit of value-added can have a very different impact upon long-term growth depending on the sector 
where it is produced. Manufacturing is paramount in this respect, due to its greater scope for 
introducing new technologies and high-productivity activities; fostering dynamic economies of scale, 
economic diversification, backward and forward linkages and agglomeration economies; supporting 
export diversification, import substitution and alleviation of the balance of payments constraint; and 
providing higher than average wages, fostering growth through the Keynesian multiplier (Tregenna, 
2009).  
 
Fourth, investment financing depends on corporate profits, the propensity of firms to invest 
productively, and the „functionality‟ of the domestic financial system (Studart, 1995), which the TDR 
calls the „profit-investment nexus‟ (TDR, 2016, p.141; UNCTAD, 2012, p.10). Once this is in place, 
output, employment and income can rise rapidly, triggering structural economic changes (UNCTAD, 
2012, pp.2, 9). This approach stands in sharp contrast with mainstream (especially endogenous) growth 
models drawing upon Solow, that suggest that DTEs ought to import capital from the AEs through 
foreign direct investment, portfolio inflows or loans. The TDR claims that, sometimes, the opposite 
holds; that is, manufacturing-led fast-growth economies can run current account surpluses and export 
capital to slower-growing economies, while capital-importing countries often grow less rapidly and 
confront greater volatility. 
 
Fifth, development requires both long-term financing and macroeconomic stability. This includes 
strong regulations compelling finance to serve productive enterprise, and demand management policies 
to support structural transformation. For example, the pursuit of short-term fiscal stability can compress 
public investment in infrastructure, with adverse effects upon long-term growth. The cumulative 
curtailment of investment, employment, output and growth rates lowers the economy‟s productive 
capacity in the long-term, compared to outcomes from more growth-supporting policies.  
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Sixth, it is hard for small and poor DTEs to reach the level of investment in manufacturing and 
infrastructure that is essential for catching-up. The market, institutional, financial, technological and 
other requirements needed for successful growth and global convergence can be supported by 
international co-operation among the DTEs, and by a more constructive policy stance by the AEs (see 
TDR 2015, p.17). The latter is especially important, since the North-South orientation of trade, 
infrastructures and technologies makes many DTEs overly dependent on the macroeconomic, trade and 
financial policies of the AEs.  
 
In sum, the „TDR approach‟ suggests that a market-based economic structure drawing upon static 
comparative advantages and IFI policy advice is sub-optimal from the point of view of long-term 
growth. In contrast, historical evidence suggests that industrial policies inspired by heterodox 
economics, and supported by a compatible financial, institutional and regulatory framework can 
promote the intersectoral shift of resources towards manufacturing, raise aggregate productivity and 
sustain economic development.  
 
3 – The TDR 2015 
 
Finance is both the analytical lynchpin of the TDR 2015 and a major battleground of UNCTAD‟s 
work, and it is against this dual backdrop that the TDR 2015‟s contribution will be assessed. The 
Report focuses on the post-crisis world economy and the adverse impact of the international monetary 
and financial system (IMFS) upon the DTEs, across international flows of capital, liquidity provision, 
the regulation of banking and finance, debt restructuring mechanisms and long-term development 
finance. The TDR 2015 includes six chapters; the first reviews the state of the global economy and how 
global trends impact national development (plus a short annex on the de-financialisation of commodity 
markets). The second examines the macroeconomic costs of financialisation. The third focuses on the 
challenges confronting the IMFS and the scope for reform. The fourth assesses regulatory reforms in 
the post-crisis period. The fifth probes the perennial issue of the external debt of the DTEs, and the 
sixth explores the development potential of alternative channels of finance, including overseas 
development aid (ODA), public-private partnerships (PPPs), sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and 
multilateral, regional and national development banks (DBs). Across these chapters the TDR 2015 
offers a systematic critique of FDG and the failures of the IMFS to live up to the developmental 
outcomes promised by the IFIs and mainstream advocates of „globalisation‟.  
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3. 1 – FDG and the IMFS 
 
The TDR 2015 argues that conventional policy advice concerning development finance, inspired by 
mainstream economics and neoliberal political agendas, leads to volatility and inefficiency in the global 
monetary and financial architecture, with high costs for the DTEs. Rather than helping to cover 
financing needs and supporting inclusive development and global convergence, the IMFS promotes 
short-termist and speculative resource flows, undermines monetary and financial stability, and works 
against the inclusive agenda in the SDGs. These limitations can be addressed only by proactive 
government policy, strong financial regulation and the allocation of resources for developmental goals. 
 
The critique of FDG in the TDR 2015 contrasts a bloated global finance with a sluggish „real‟ 
economy, amply illustrated by global trade flows:  
 
In 1980, global trade had been at a level relatively close to that of global finance, at around a 
quarter of world GDP, but by 2008 … global finance had grown to become nine times greater 
than global trade … [F]inance [also] became much more interconnected … [T]hese 
developments overwhelmed the institutional checks and balances that had ensured … financial 
stability during the three decades after the end of the Second World War … A new generation 
of policymakers responded with calls for the rapid dismantling of the remaining financial 
regulations, extolling, instead, the virtues of self-regulating markets as the best … approach for 
combining efficiency and stability in a globalizing world. The resulting financial system … 
turned out to be much less capable of identifying systemic stresses and weaknesses and 
anticipating bigger shocks … or mitigating the resultant damage. The burden of such crises has, 
instead, fallen squarely on the balance sheet of the public sector, and indeed, on citizens at large 
(TDR, 2015, p.ii; see also p.30). 
 
The critique of the IMFS under FDG reaches surprisingly strong conclusions, for a UN publication: 
 
[T]he present international monetary system has acquired its own pyromaniac tendencies, by 
promoting policy interventions that have frequently exacerbated recessions, instead of softening 
them, and by placing … the burden of adjustment too heavily on the debtors and deficit 
countries (TDR, 2015, p.viii). 
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Despite its considerable strengths, the TDR 2015 also contains ambiguities which leave in relative 
obscurity central aspects of contemporary capitalism. In particular, the concept of FDG is used 
descriptively and almost unproblematically by UNCTAD, tacitly in the TDR 2015 and explicitly 
elsewhere. FDG, which may also be expressed as neoliberalism (a term used only ocasionally in the 
TDR series), encapsulates a wide array of changes in the structures, agencies and relations of economic 
and social reproduction across production, employment, international integration, the state, ideology 
and so on. These are grounded upon the spread of finance and financial interests into ever more areas 
of economic and social life, and they constitute (what we describe as) the neoliberal system of 
accumulation (Fine, 2013-14; Fine and Saad-Filho, 2016; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005).  
 
The spread of neoliberalism has enhanced the influence of finance over resource allocation, including 
the flows of money, credit and foreign exchange, whose consequences are neatly captured in the TDR 
2015 (see also Panitch and Gindin, 2012; Panitch and Konings, 2008; Rude, 2005). They include the 
diffusion of a peculiar form of (financialised) short-termism in economic decisions; the imperative for 
generating and appropriating surplus out of finance, and the explosive growth of rewards to high-
ranking capitalists and managers in every sector, especially finance itself, fuelling the concentration of 
income. These forms of accumulation are mutually reinforcing, but they can also dysfunctionally 
diverge, triggering economic crises whose burdens are all-too-often shouldered by the public sector and 
the poor.  
 
3.2 – Development Finance Today 
 
The TDR 2015 focuses on the consequences of FDG for development, arguing that long-term 
developmental financing is poorly served by a short-termist and speculative IMFS. Not only does the 
profitability of private finance sit uneasily alongside social, environmental and other development 
goals, but resource flows under FDG are often highly concentrated both geographically and sectorally. 
They generally bypass the poorest and most financially constrained economies and the long-term 
investment needs of the DTEs. On this basis, the TDR 2015 (p.151) argues for the role of the state in 
mobilising and shepherding financial flows toward transformative projects, especially in infrastructure 
(with its large, long-term and lumpy financing needs), start-ups and small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs, which pose greater risks), and projects with positive social externalities (which do not readily 
meet narrow profit criteria). The global financial crisis has made these areas even less appealing, since 
„investors appear willing to accept very low returns on government bonds rather than assume the risk of 
investing in private productive enterprises‟ (TDR, 2015, p.xviii).  
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The Report examines in detail the role of four potential sources of development finance: aid, PPPs, 
sovereign funds and development banks. It concludes that ODA and DBs (and public finance more 
generally) have the greatest development potential (TDR, 2015, p.167) but both need scaling up, with 
overall aid levels falling short of even of the modest 0.7 per cent target. ODA is also in need of reform, 
as between 1990 and 2013 „the share of ODA flows to economic infrastructure and the services sector, 
as well as to the production sectors, declined‟ (TDR, 2015, p.156). Similarly, most SWFs are not 
invested in support of development (TDR, 2015, p.166). Finally, the TDR 2015 suggests that PPPs 
should be treated with caution because they generally fail to create additional finance, and are often an 
accounting trick to cut fiscal spending in the short-term, while creating large fiscal liabilities in the 
longer-term (TDR, 2015, p.163). In such ways global finance can strain the public sector in DTEs, 
rather than delivering developmental outcomes.  
 
In light of these serious limitations, the Report reiterates UNCTAD‟s long-held view that DTEs ought 
to rely primarily on domestic rather external sources of finance, and that the liberalisation of capital 
flows is incompatible with development (TDR, 2015, pp. xv, 38-39 and UNCTAD, 2012, p.46). In 
particular, DTEs have become „frontier markets‟ attractive to volatile capital flows, while remaining 
vulnerable to sudden reversals. Instability also increases the risk of external debt crises, for which 
global provisions remain inadequate. These are some of the reasons why the much-hyped „decoupling‟ 
thesis put forward in the aftermath of the global crisis stretches credibility (Akyüz, 2011, 2012; Saad-
Filho, 2014).  
 
3.3 – Global Challenges 
 
The TDR 2015 offers a scathing assessment of global economic policies under FDG, arguing that they 
have fostered the growth of an unstable financialised world economy and promoted stagnation. In this 
context, the Report identifies several key policy challenges, starting with international currency flows. 
The dollar-based IMFS has expanded rapidly since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System; 
however, it remains prone to large swings in liquidity, making the world economy vulnerable to 
financial, exchange rate and balance of payments crises. Yet, despite rhetorical gyrations, the AEs and 
the IFIs have continued to insist on the liberalisation of domestic finance and international capital 
flows, even though they increase DTE vulnerability to external shocks, limit tools to manage them, and 
undermine long-term structural transformation. Creative macroeconomic solutions to manage these 
risks in the DTEs are essential, and they must be supported by global measures to curb speculative 
flows. 
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The next challenge concerns access to short-term liquidity to manage shocks. Given the risks and 
rigidities of the IMFS, several DTEs have adopted self-insurance policies to secure exchange rate 
stability and emergency finance, especially since the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. They have 
done so either through the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves or (less successfully) through 
reserve pools and new DTE-led lending facilities, especially in East Asia, Latin America, and among 
the BRICS. This defensive strategy pushes the DTEs towards the maximisation of their current account 
surpluses, which is harder during a global slowdown, and in any case impossible for all countries 
simultaneously; attempts to do so are also deflationary for the global economy, and may trigger 
currency wars. Alternatively, the DTEs can seek capital inflows through portfolio investment or loans. 
This option became especially attractive as several AEs adopted ultra-low interest rates together with 
fiscal austerity and quantitative easing in the wake of the global crisis, making large amounts of 
resources available for speculative investment worldwide. However, even when those resources fuelled 
short-term growth in the DTEs, they also tended to inflate asset prices and consumption bubbles, rather 
than supporting long-term productive investment (TDR, 2015, pp.17, 31, 45; for the case of China, see 
Akyüz, 2011 and Yu, 2010).  
 
Finally, given the contractionary bias of the IMFS, it is necessary to ensure a more equitable sharing of 
the burden of current account adjustments. This burden derives, in part, from the asymmetry due to the 
need to curtail spending in the deficit countries without offsetting spending increases in the surplus 
ones (TDR, 2015, p.56). These stagnationist tendencies compound the deflationary implications of the 
deteriorating wage share under FDG (examined in the TDR 2013), leaving the global recovery almost 
entirely dependent on bouts of expansion of liquidity (TDR, 2015, p.29). Taken together, these 
challenges derive from the structure of the IMFS which, in its current form, will inevitably generate 
instability as well as inequity (TDR, 2015, p.56). 
 
3.4 – Towards a Resolution 
 
The TDR 2015 claims that a „positive reform agenda is needed to establish a closer link between 
financial systems and the real economy‟ (p.113). Rebuilding this link is the basis of UNCTAD‟s 
alternative to FDG, which it calls „development-led globalisation‟ (UNCTAD, 2011; UNCTAD, 2012, 
p.viii). 
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For UNCTAD, AE monetary policies are insufficient to confront the twin problems of excess liquidity 
– partly due to post-crisis policies – and sluggish growth. Instead, demand- and incomes-focused 
policies should be used, including minimum wage legislation, stronger collective bargaining 
institutions, higher transfers and greater public investment (TDR, 2015, p.47). In the DTEs, these 
policies should be accompanied by monetary, fiscal and industrial policies to expand demand and raise 
productivity, and capital controls to prevent the boom-bust cycles of international capital flows from 
destabilising exchange rates and domestic financial markets (TDR, 2015, p.71; see also UNCTAD, 
2012, p.29). Domestic policies:  
 
should be supplemented by global and regional measures that discourage the proliferation of 
speculative financial flows … [I]mplementing countercyclical macroeconomic policies, 
improving income distribution and extending fiscal space for development purposes have a 
significantly greater chance of success when applied also by … the world at large. Indeed, 
domestic policy stimuli, when applied by only a few countries, are considerably weakened … 
[and] can even yield perverse effects if global investors and international financial institutions 
respond in ways that generate greater volatility and uncertainty (TDR, 2015, p.47). 
 
Securing global macroeconomic and exchange rate stability will require a reform of the IMFS (TDR, 
2015, pp.64, 76), including a much greater role for SDRs at the expense of the US dollar, in order to 
reduce the bias in favour of the country issuing the world‟s reserve currency (TDR, 2015, p.66). 
 
Finally, the TDR highlights the need for reform of international banking and finance. In particular, 
despite the apparent post-crisis consensus in favour of tighter regulation, there has been a remarkable 
failure to grapple with systemic fragilities and curb short-termist, speculative and procyclical behaviour 
amongst financial institutions, which particularly affect DTEs. Restoring the link between the real 
economy and the financial system requires the separation of retail and investment banking, the 
regulation of shadow banking, and reforming the credit rating agencies, whose reports can distort 
borrowing costs and deter DTEs from implementing reforms which may be deemed „unfriendly‟ 
towards global investors. 
 
4 – Limitations of the TDR 2015 
 
A chief limitation of the TDR 2015 stems from its analysis of FDG and the attendant scope for policy 
reform. In common with other UNCTAD writings, FDG is seen here both as the policy-driven 
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(reversible) outcome of the liberalisation of finance, and as a possibly irreversible (systemic) stage of 
capitalism (Saad-Filho, 2008).  
 
On the one hand, then, FDG is reductively presented as the epiphenomenal consequence of a self-
serving finance-led conspiracy, which has imposed liberalisation policies and driven the decoupling of 
finance from the „real economy‟ (see, for example, TDR, 2015, p.113). In this case, the (otherwise 
unexplained) collapse of postwar Keynesianism could be reversed through the finance-taming reforms 
outlined in successive TDRs. Each policy change would help to reduce macroeconomic volatility and 
create incentives for further reform; gradually, something approaching postwar Keynesianism would be 
rebuilt by far-sighted policymakers, supported by industrial capital, the middle classes and organised 
workers. Together, they could build a world that is more egalitarian, better suited to the needs of DTEs, 
and more in tune with the interests of production rather than finance.  
 
On the other hand, FDG is (implicitly) recognised systemically, as the contemporary mode of existence 
of capitalism; for example: „the growing influence of financial markets and institutions, known as 
“financialization”, affects how wealth is produced and distributed‟ (TDR, 2015, p. 27, emphasis 
added). This opens the door to the recognition – never explicit in UNCTAD writings – that, in practice, 
Keynesianism was not merely associated with progressive forms of state expenditure and intervention, 
and that the postwar boom was not simply driven by a „consensual‟ social-democracy. Instead, both 
were distinguished by large-scale economic and social restructuring with internationalisation of all 
forms of capital to the fore, especially of productive capital, supported by (US-dominated) finance, 
with a heavy role for the state in promoting such restructuring (see Duménil and Lévy, 2004; Fine and 
Saad-Filho, 2016; Panitch and Gindin, 2012). Similarly, Keynesianism collapsed not because of a 
finance-led „conspiracy‟ but because of the economic and social transformations that Keynesianism 
itself had engendered, and by the contradictions embodied in its own policies (Gowan, 1999; Saad-
Filho, 2007). Finally, FDG has internal coherence and self-reinforcing features across the economy, 
society and political sphere, which have transformed rather than merely curtailed the state and public 
policies.  
 
This perspective emphasises that FDG has not only changed government policies, but also modified the 
conditions within which policy is conceived, formulated, implemented and monitored; consequently, 
piecemeal reforms will tend to fine-tune rather than undermine the current stage of capitalism. For 
example, open regionalism and international policy co-ordination limit the scope for activist industrial 
and trade policies; membership of the IMF and the World Bank hamper the possibility of controlling 
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finance, capital flows, exchange rates and the balance of payments; and the WTO curtails the 
internalisation of systems of provision, even though they are essential for macroeconomic stability and 
sustainable growth. Important openings for reformist policies may exist, but would have limited 
bearing on the long-term performance and underlying dynamics of the global economy and, even if 
achieved today, would remain hostages to neoliberal imperatives. This systemic perspective implies 
that transcending FDG will require changes across economics, politics and society, which are beyond 
the scope of the TDR analytically as well as politically.  
 
This ambiguity is symptomatic of „the difficult process of finding a balance between institutional 
coherence and analytical creativity and … establishing a line of research in the UN which combines a 
sense of institutional responsibility with pushing the boundaries‟ (Kozul-Wright, 2012, p.63). That is, 
the TDR is – possibly irrevocably – torn between its (institutionally necessary) faith in the international 
system to deliver improvements, while (implicitly) recognising that, especially under FDG, this system 
is geared to the exploitation of countries and peoples and the reproduction of inequality within as well 
as between countries.  
 
This tension is partly due to the ideological differences between UNCTAD and most AEs, IFIs and the 
WTO, which have led powerful countries to nibble constantly at the scope of the TDR, demanding that 
UNCTAD stops „trespassing‟ into the territory of (much more generously endowed) mainstream 
organisations. This difficulty is directly responsible for the resource limitations constraining the TDR: 
„[T]he TDR costs one-fifth of what it costs to produce the World Development Report. So all those 
who worry about value for money and results-based management may want to take a careful look at a 
comparison of what the TDR has achieved within its resource constraints compared with the reports of 
other organizations‟ (Kozul-Wright, 2012, p.63). Yet, the resource constraint will not resolve itself 
through benign institutional processes. Rather, it is both deliberate and politically-driven, designed to 
dampen the most important dissenting voice in the international policy arena. That this voice endures, 
and has gained fresh legitimacy and traction after its prescient pre-crash warnings about the systemic 
fragilities of the global financial system (for example TDR, 2001), is testament to why the world needs 
this radical development voice, now, arguably, more than ever.  
 
5 – Conclusion 
 
The TDR is the most important heterodox publication in the UN system. Over the years, the Report has 
provided much-needed global perspective on the asymmetries curtailing late development, trenchant 
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critique of the IFIs and their policy prescriptions, and a keen insight into the instabilities and fragilities 
of FDG and its threats to the DTEs. The uncompromising approach of the TDR has helped to shift the 
IFIs from their intransigent fundamentalism, typical of the period between the early 1980s and the mid-
1990s, towards a (reluctant and still heavily hedged) recognition of the importance of policy space, 
industrial policy, capital controls, debt relief, and international co-operation. The TDR has also helped 
to put such important aspects of development as structural transformation back on the global policy 
agenda, for example, in the SDGs. 
 
Each volume of the TDR is also limited in different ways, but those shortcomings do not float in an 
intellectual vacuum from which they can be exorcised by alternative theories, more powerful tools, or 
better data. Instead, they must be understood within their institutional context: after all, the TDR walks 
an analytical tightrope hanging above a political minefield. UNCTAD‟s work remains under attack, 
and the four-yearly mandate renewal negotiations between AEs and DTEs provide insights into key 
fault-lines in contemporary North-South relations over development issues. For example, during the 
discussions at UNCTAD XIV, in 2016, the organisation‟s authorisation to work on such topics as 
policy space, debt, the WTO Doha Round, technology transfer and tax was – again – curtailed (Khor, 
2016). Nevertheless, a reaffirmed mandate was provided to conduct independent analytical and 
research work, and to remain the key UN institution integrating of trade, development, finance, 
technology transfer, investment and sustainable development. Those relatively subdued debates stand 
in contrast with the vociferous exchanges at UNCTAD XIII, in 2012, when the organisation‟s mandate 
to work on the global financial system came under severe threat from AEs pushing for the delegation of 
analysis of the global financial system solely to the IMF (Wade, 2013). 
 
These diplomatic pressures and resourcing constraints compound the theoretical and methodological 
ambiguities of the TDR‟s account of FDG. They drive the Report towards a pragmatic reformism, that 
is, the attempt to open spaces of contestation supporting global change against the constraints of FDG. 
However, the analysis in the TDR itself undermines the notion that political fiat or piecemeal policy 
changes can overcome the systemic flaws of FDG. Yet, despite these tensions, conceptual tangles and 
political difficulties, the TDR navigates the dangerous straits of contemporary political economy with 
flair. It remains the best annual report produced by any international organisation, a source of prescient 
insight on the contemporary world, and a lodestar for heterodox economists and policymakers 
everywhere. 
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